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INTRODUCTION 
This Essay considers the influence of Richard Posner’s judi-
cial opinions about antitrust law. In thirty-six years on the 
bench, Posner wrote about one antitrust opinion per year, which 
represents roughly 1 percent of his judicial output. The opinions 
address a wide range of conduct, from restraints of trade to mo-
nopolization to mergers, plus such related issues as antitrust in-
jury, standing, and damages. Posner’s antitrust opinions are 
frequently cited by courts and commentators, and many of the 
citations are branded with a “Posner, J.” parenthetical.1 
I do not attempt a comprehensive account of Posner’s ex-
traordinary influence as a judge. There is too much ground to 
cover; indeed, his importance to antitrust law alone has been the 
subject of a recent symposium.2 Instead, I focus on a single cate-
gory of conduct: vertical restraints on distribution, such as re-
sale price maintenance (RPM), maximum RPM, and exclusive 
sales territories. Posner, together with other members of the 
Chicago School, sought to shift the rule governing these re-
straints from a flat (per se) prohibition to a more relaxed or nu-
anced evaluation. 
The law of vertical restraints was indeed transformed over 
the course of Posner’s long engagement with antitrust law. Three 
strategies were important in this effort. First, and most obvious, 
Posner deployed economic reasoning to justify more lenient 
 
 † Professor of Law, New York University School of Law. I thank Harry First,  
Eleanor Fox, Bert Huang, Jon Jacobson, Saul Levmore, and Tim Wu for helpful com-
ments. Alex Gelb, Tim Keegan, Alison Perry, and Phantila Phataraprasit provided out-
standing research assistance. 
 1 For an early analysis of citations as a measure of judicial influence, see Richard 
A. Posner, Cardozo: A Study in Reputation 69–73 (Chicago 1990). See also Stephen J. 
Choi and G. Mitu Gulati, Mr. Justice Posner? Unpacking the Statistics, 61 NYU Annual 
Survey Am Law 19, 28 (2005) (documenting the frequency of citations of Posner’s opin-
ions between 1998 and 2000). 
 2 See generally the recent collection in the Antitrust Source, with contributions by 
Rebecca Haw Allensworth, Eleanor Fox, Doug Ginsburg, Keith Hylton, and Steve Salop. 
Symposium: Judge Posner Retrospective, 18 Antitrust Source 1 (Oct 2018). 
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treatment. Once that began to work, and some but not all re-
straints were subject to lenient treatment, a second strategy 
kicked in: to criticize the inconsistencies and press for their 
harmonization. 
Third, Posner opened up an indirect line of attack by shift-
ing attention from the question of antitrust liability to the ques-
tion of antitrust injury—whether a plaintiff has suffered an in-
jury of the type the antitrust laws were intended to prevent. 
Even if a plaintiff shows an antitrust violation, there might be 
no antitrust injury because the plaintiff’s claimed harm is eco-
nomically incoherent or results from more competition, rather 
than less. Antitrust injury provided the means to sidestep and 
undermine Supreme Court precedent that Posner disagreed 
with but could not ignore. 
Posner’s influence as a judge is impossible to isolate from 
his impact as a leading antitrust scholar, in part because his 
opinions often have drawn on arguments that he first made as 
an academic. In vertical restraints, the interaction of judicial 
and academic influence is particularly pronounced. Accordingly, 
I also discuss Posner’s academic work as it fueled and intersected 
with his judicial output. 
This Essay proceeds in four parts. Part I describes Posner’s 
successful academic critique of per se liability, which empha-
sized the benign effects of various vertical restraints and 
pressed for consistent treatment among them. Part II explains 
how Posner, in one of his first antitrust cases as a judge, 
adapted this critique to the evaluation of maximum RPM. Here, 
Posner’s conclusion that maximum RPM plaintiffs suffered no 
antitrust injury not only offered a new avenue to criticize per se 
liability on economic grounds but also set up a new source of in-
consistency, this time between the narrow scope of recovery and 
broad scope of liability. Part III considers the use of antitrust in-
jury and analogous doctrines as a weapon to undermine other 
broad impositions of liability in antitrust law and beyond. 
Part IV turns to horizontal restraints, a second area of anti-
trust law in which one might have expected Posner’s distinctive 
scholarship to leave a strong imprint on his work as a judge. 
Here, however, Posner did little to convert his academic ideas 
about horizontal restraints into law and ultimately became their 
fiercest judicial critic. In one of his last antitrust opinions, Posner 
shaped Seventh Circuit doctrine to expressly reject one of his 
signature academic positions. The contrast to vertical restraints, 
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an area in which Posner pressed hard to incorporate his academ-
ic views into antitrust law, is stark. 
I.  THE ACADEMIC CRITIQUE OF PER SE LIABILITY 
Vertical intrabrand restraints place restrictions on how a 
dealer sells the manufacturer’s product and at what price. For 
example, RPM requires a retailer to sell a product at or above a 
minimum price set by the manufacturer. Maximum RPM is the 
flip side of minimum RPM. It places a ceiling rather than a floor 
on the retailer’s price. Nonprice restraints, such as exclusive 
sales territories, have broadly similar effects to RPM. 
In 1969, when Posner joined the Chicago faculty, all three 
types of restraint—RPM, maximum RPM, and nonprice re-
straints—were unlawful per se.3 The Supreme Court subse-
quently shifted the law from per se illegality to the more lenient 
rule of reason in a series of cases decided over a period of thirty 
years.4 The rule of reason requires a plaintiff to demonstrate an-
ticompetitive effects and invites an analysis of procompetitive 
justifications and market power. This sea change is widely at-
tributed to a sustained critique of per se liability by Chicago 
School thinkers, supported by the judicial opinions of Chicago 
School judges.5 
Posner’s influence on vertical restraint law arose first as an 
academic member of the Chicago School, whose other prominent 
members included future judges Robert Bork and Frank Easter-
brook. Posner’s initial critique of vertical restraints doctrine was 
published in 1975 and incorporated in a book published the fol-
lowing year.6 A major target was the Court’s opinion in United 
 
 3 See Dr. Miles Medical Co v John D. Park & Sons Co, 220 US 373, 409 (1911) 
(RPM); Albrecht v Herald Co, 390 US 145, 152–53 (1968) (maximum RPM); United 
States v Arnold, Schwinn & Co, 388 US 365, 382 (1967) (nonprice restraints). 
 4 See Continental T.V., Inc v GTE Sylvania Inc, 433 US 36, 58 (1977) (overruling 
Schwinn); State Oil Co v Khan, 522 US 3, 7 (1997) (overruling Albrecht); Leegin Creative 
Leather Products, Inc v PSKS, Inc, 551 US 877, 907 (2007) (overruling Dr. Miles). 
 5 See generally Daniel A. Crane, Book Review, Chicago, Post-Chicago, and Neo-
Chicago, 76 U Chi L Rev 1911 (2009) (assessing the influence of the Chicago School on 
antitrust doctrine). 
 6 See generally Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Policy and the Supreme Court: An 
Analysis of the Restricted Distribution, Horizontal Merger and Potential Competition De-
cisions, 75 Colum L Rev 282 (1975). See also Richard A. Posner, Antitrust Law: An Eco-
nomic Perspective 147–66 (Chicago 1976). Antitrust Law was Posner’s third book, follow-
ing Economic Analysis of Law (Little, Brown 1973) and Antitrust: Cases, Economic 
Notes, and Other Materials (West 1974). 
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States v Arnold, Schwinn, & Co,7 which had imposed per se lia-
bility for nonprice restraints.8 Posner was unusually well posi-
tioned to criticize Schwinn, having briefed and argued (and won) 
the case as a young lawyer in the Solicitor General’s office. The 
critique thus represented, as he candidly wrote, a “180-degree 
turn.”9 
Posner argued that, as an economic matter, nonprice re-
straints generally lack any anticompetitive effect and often en-
hance interbrand competition between manufacturers. This ap-
proach was, of course, a version of the first strategy discussed 
above. For example, an exclusive sales territory may promote 
competition by solving a free rider problem among retailers in 
the provision of point-of-sale services valued by consumers.10 
Meanwhile, a particular restraint might be harmless from the 
standpoint of intrabrand competition given the manufacturer’s 
strong desire to promote retailer competition and thereby mini-
mize retailer margins.11 Posner advocated lenient treatment for 
RPM along the same lines.12 
Posner’s scholarship soon caught the attention of the  
Supreme Court. In 1977, the Court overruled Schwinn, holding 
in Continental T.V., Inc v GTE Sylvania Inc13 that nonprice re-
straints are subject to the rule of reason.14 The Court’s opinion 
cited Posner extensively (alongside other academics), noting his 
account of the manufacturer’s free rider problem15 and its inter-
est in preserving intrabrand competition.16 Beyond the specific 
analysis of nonprice restraints, the Court’s opinion was notable 
 
 7 388 US 365 (1967). 
 8 Id at 382. 
 9 Richard A. Posner, The Rule of Reason and the Economic Approach: Reflections 
on the Sylvania Decision, 45 U Chi L Rev 1, 2 (1977) (describing the position taken in 
Posner, 75 Colum L Rev at 282 (cited in note 6)). 
 10 Posner, 75 Colum L Rev at 283–84 (cited in note 6), citing Lester G. Telser, Why 
Should Manufacturers Want Fair Trade?, 3 J L & Econ 86 (1960). Posner argued that 
this benefit is particularly important to manufacturers that are trying to enter the mar-
ket or expand. Posner, 75 Colum L Rev at 293 (cited in note 6). 
 11 Posner, 75 Colum L Rev at 283, 287–88 (cited in note 6). 
 12 As discussed in Part II, the effects of maximum RPM are different. 
 13 433 US 36 (1977). 
 14 Id at 58. 
 15 See id at 55; Posner, 75 Colum L Rev at 285 (cited in note 6). 
 16 See Sylvania, 433 US at 56 n 24 (manufacturer’s interest in minimizing retailer 
margins), citing Posner, 75 Colum L Rev at 283 (cited in note 6); Sylvania, 433 US at 56 
(manufacturer’s interest in intrabrand competition), citing Posner, 75 Colum L Rev at 
283, 287–88 (cited in note 6). Posner’s comments about entry and expansion were picked 
up by a concurring opinion. See Sylvania, 433 US at 65 & n 7 (White concurring in the 
judgment), citing Posner, 75 Colum L Rev at 293 (cited in note 6). 
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for its emphasis on economic analysis.17 This emphasis was am-
plified by the Court’s repeated citation of Posner and other eco-
nomically minded scholars and its acknowledgment of heavy ac-
ademic criticism of the Schwinn rule.18 
Posner’s academic work also identified inconsistencies and 
pressed for their harmonization, a version of the second strategy. 
Nonprice restraints and RPM have similar economic effects. 
Among other similarities, both can support interbrand competi-
tion. Posner’s pre-Sylvania paper had argued that nonprice re-
straints and RPM therefore should be treated similarly—that is, 
leniently—given their similar economic effects.19 Justice Byron 
White, writing separately in Sylvania and anticipating the slip-
pery slope, acknowledged the force of this point as a reason to 
resist an economic approach to vertical restraints.20 In a second 
paper published a few months after Sylvania, Posner empha-
sized the inconsistency that Sylvania had opened up between 
nonprice restraints (rule of reason) and RPM (per se illegal).21 
He pointed to the Sylvania Court’s emphasis on free riding and 
interbrand competition as a reason to get rid of per se liability 
for RPM and maximum RPM, describing the latter as an “en-
dangered” precedent.22 
Posner spotted a further discrepancy arising from Sylvania, 
between nonprice restraints and maximum RPM. Maximum 
RPM is useful as a way to rein in exploitation of market power 
by a dealer, including market power arising from the grant of 
exclusive sales territories. On the one hand, Sylvania permitted 
some exclusive sales territories under the rule of reason. Yet the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Albrecht v Herald Co23 flatly prohib-
ited the use of maximum RPM, despite its usefulness in conjunc-
tion with those sales territories. Posner exploited the resulting 
tension, pointing to the facts of Albrecht itself: 
 
 17 See Sylvania, 433 US at 53 n 21 (“Competitive economies have social and politi-
cal as well as economic advantages, . . . but an antitrust policy divorced from market 
considerations would lack any objective benchmarks.”). 
 18 See id at 47–48 & n 13, citing generally Posner, 75 Colum L Rev 282 (cited in 
note 6), among others. 
 19 Posner, 75 Colum L Rev at 298 (cited in note 6) (advocating consistently lenient 
treatment for both types of restraint). Posner further argued that restraints achieved 
through agency rather than sales contracts should be treated the same. Id. 
 20 Sylvania, 433 US at 70 (White concurring in the judgment), citing Posner, 75 
Colum L Rev at 298 (cited in note 6). 
 21 Posner, 45 U Chi L Rev at 7–9 (cited in note 9). 
 22 Id at 10. 
 23 390 US 145 (1968). 
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Because the publisher [in Albrecht] had assigned the dis-
tributors exclusive territories, the most likely reason for the 
price ceiling was to prevent the distributor from using his 
distribution monopoly for his benefit rather than the pub-
lisher’s. The logic of Sylvania is that restrictions imposed on 
dealers by manufacturers promote interbrand competition 
and are therefore not per se illegal, save perhaps if the 
manufacturer has a monopoly. That logic demolishes  
Albrecht.24 
The implication was that Albrecht was wrongly decided, at least 
when maximum RPM was used for this purpose. 
II.  ANTITRUST INJURY AND MAXIMUM RPM 
In 1981, when Posner joined the Seventh Circuit, the evolu-
tion in vertical restraints doctrine was well underway. As a 
judge, Posner soon had an opportunity to put his academic cri-
tiques to practical use.25 In 1984, his court took up Jack Walters 
& Sons Corp v Morton Building, Inc,26 a maximum RPM claim 
squarely within the Albrecht rule.27 
Posner’s opinion rejecting the antitrust claim criticized both 
the economic reasoning underlying Albrecht and its fit with other 
cases. The opinion explained, relying on Easterbrook’s academic 
work, that maximum RPM tends to force prices down toward the 
competitive level.28 Moreover, as discussed above, maximum 
RPM can have a particular procompetitive effect in conjunction 
with exclusive dealer territories by reining in the exploitation of 
market power. Posner also reviewed the discrepancy between 
Sylvania and Albrecht identified in his own academic writing,29 
 
 24 Posner, 45 U Chi L Rev at 12 (cited in note 9). 
 25 By this point, Posner had written a third paper proposing per se legality for all 
intrabrand restraints. Richard A. Posner, The Next Step in the Antitrust Treatment of 
Restricted Distribution: Per Se Legality, 48 U Chi L Rev 6, 23 (1981). 
 26 737 F2d 698 (7th Cir 1984). 
 27 Id at 706.  
 28 Id at 706–07, citing Frank H. Easterbrook, Maximum Price Fixing, 48 U Chi L 
Rev 886, 890 n 20 (1981). 
 29 Id at 706 (“Now that assigning exclusive territories to dealers is lawful if reason-
able, a manufacturer-imposed price ceiling intended to limit the power that exclusive 
territories give dealers to raise prices regardless of what other dealers in the manufac-
turer’s product are charging may also be lawful in some cases.”). 
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although (characteristically) he did not cite that work in the 
opinion.30 
These two arguments obviously did not provide an adequate 
basis for ignoring controlling Supreme Court precedent. Posner 
then turned to a third strategy that sidestepped Albrecht rather 
than directly confronting it. The vehicle for this shift was the 
antitrust injury doctrine. 
Antitrust injury requires a private plaintiff seeking damages 
to show not only that its injury was caused by unlawful conduct 
but also that its injury was caused by that which makes the 
conduct unlawful. This hurdle to recovery was announced in 
Brunswick Corp v Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc,31 a case decided a 
few months before Sylvania that initially received much less at-
tention. The plaintiff alleged compensable harm caused by a 
merger of competing bowling centers. Its theory of harm was 
that absent the merger, some of the bowling centers would have 
gone out of business, thereby benefiting the plaintiff. In essence, 
plaintiff complained about an increase in competition rather 
than a decrease.32 
The Court reviewed the statutory provision providing a 
right of recovery to “person[s] . . . injured . . . by reason of” an 
antitrust violation.33 The Court decided that although the plain-
tiff might literally be a “person injured by reason of” unlawful 
conduct, damages were unavailable because the plaintiff’s loss 
did not occur “‘by reason of’ that which made the acquisitions 
unlawful.”34 Even if plaintiff suffered injury, it did not suffer 
“antitrust injury, which is to say injury of the type the antitrust 
laws were intended to prevent and that flows from that which 
makes defendants’ acts unlawful.”35 
Antitrust injury is sometimes framed as being about the 
“wrong plaintiff”: yes, the conduct complained of may well be an-
ticompetitive, but this plaintiff does not have an injury that 
flows from the anticompetitive nature of the conduct. However, 
 
 30 Instead, the opinion cited Robert Pitofsky for this point. See Robert Pitofsky, The 
Sylvania Case: Antitrust Analysis of Non-Price Vertical Restrictions, 78 Colum L Rev 1, 
16 n 59 (1978). 
 31 429 US 477 (1977). 
 32 See id at 480–81. 
 33 15 USC § 15 (codifying § 4 of the Clayton Act, which provides a cause of action to 
“any person who shall be injured in his business or property by reason of anything for-
bidden in the antitrust laws”). 
 34 Brunswick, 429 US at 488 (emphasis added). 
 35 Id at 489 (emphasis in original). 
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it can equally be understood as denying recovery for the wrong 
kind of harm. 
In Jack Walters, Posner explained that “[t]here is nothing 
esoteric about the Brunswick rule. It is the application to anti-
trust law of venerable principles of tort causation illustrated by 
Gorris v Scott.”36 Gorris is a nineteenth-century English tort 
case that Posner had examined in academic work with Bill 
Landes the year before.37 Posner described the case as follows: 
The plaintiff’s animals, which were being transported on the 
deck of the defendant’s ship, were washed overboard in a 
storm. They would have been saved if the deck had been 
penned, as required by statute. But since the purpose of the 
statute was to prevent contagion, not drowning, the defend-
ant was not liable.38 
The Gorris analogy brings together two common features of 
Posner opinions: an effort to demystify specialized law by con-
necting it back to general principles and a love of vivid facts. He 
found reason to cite Gorris in ten subsequent opinions, about 
half as often as Raffles v Wichelhaus.39 
Applying the Brunswick/Gorris rule to the claim at hand, 
Posner concluded that the plaintiff’s only harm came from com-
petitors’ lower prices, which was hardly the sort of harm that 
antitrust is concerned about.40 And in a further twist of the 
knife, Posner found plaintiff’s case even weaker than in Gorris. 
There, “[t]he loss of the animals was a pure social cost, while the 
loss to [plaintiff] from lawful price competition was a gain to 
consumers.”41 
So far as I know, this was Posner’s first discussion of anti-
trust injury. I am not aware of his having previously discussed 
the issue in his own academic work. Posner may have been en-
couraged to adopt an antitrust injury approach in Jack Walters 
 
 36 Jack Walters, 737 F2d at 708–09 (citation omitted). 
 37 See William M. Landes and Richard A. Posner, Causation in Tort Law: An Eco-
nomic Approach, 12 J Legal Stud 109, 130–31 (1983). 
 38 Jack Walters, 737 F2d at 709. 
 39 159 Eng Rep 375 (Ex 1864). See William Domnarski, Richard Posner 111 (Oxford 
2016) (reporting that Gorris is Posner’s second most frequently cited nineteenth-century 
English opinion after Raffles). 
 40 Jack Walters, 737 F2d at 709 (“[T]he only harm to Walters came from the fact 
that competing dealers (or Morton itself) would lower their prices to consumers if Walters 
did not.”). 
 41 Id. 
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by an academic article, authored by Bill Page and cited in the 
opinion, that itself bears a strong Chicago imprint.42 
Jack Walters illustrates the real potential of antitrust injury. 
A defendant or court can sidestep and neutralize the effect of li-
ability while leaving the formal scope of liability undisturbed. 
This tool is particularly powerful when the legal case for liability 
is ironclad, yet the economic theory of harm is incoherent given 
the goals of the statute. From this perspective, Albrecht was a 
perfect target. A further consequence is to place pressure on lia-
bility over time, as judges give voice to the analytical problems 
with overbroad liability. 
Posner’s opinion gave a “jolt” to the antitrust bar.43 Com-
mentators recognized it as an indirect attack on Albrecht.44 The 
Ninth Circuit, in a maximum RPM case called USA Petroleum 
Co v Atlantic Richfield Co (ARCO),45 staked out a flatly contrary 
view to Jack Walters, and the Supreme Court granted certiorari.46 
At oral argument, respondent characterized the Ninth Circuit’s 
disagreement with Judge Posner as follows: 
 
 42 See id, citing William H. Page, Antitrust Damages and Economic Efficiency: An 
Approach to Antitrust Injury, 47 U Chi L Rev 467, 491 (1980). Page was a Chicago LLM 
student, and Posner commented on the paper in draft. The subject was apparently first 
proposed to Page by another Chicago colleague, Kenneth Dam, who suggested that 
“[m]aybe the principle [of Brunswick] can be extended. You may not be able to do much 
about the substantive law, but you might be able to affect the penalties.” John E. Lopatka 
and William H. Page, Brunswick at 25: Antitrust Injury and the Evolution of Antitrust 
Law, 17 Antitrust 20, 20 (Fall 2002). 
 43 Donald J. Polden, Antitrust Standing and the Rule against Resale Price Mainte-
nance, 37 Cleve St L Rev 179, 217 (1989) (“The antitrust bar received a jolt. . . .”). 
 44 For example, Herbert Hovenkamp wrote: 
[A]ny rule requiring a plaintiff to show that it has been injured by the anti-
competitive consequences of maximum resale price maintenance is a rule of 
nonrecovery. I cannot escape the conclusion that Judge Posner—growing impa-
tient with Congress’s or the Supreme Court’s refusal to overrule Albrecht—has 
decided to undertake that task on his own. 
Herbert Hovenkamp, Chicago and Its Alternatives, 1986 Duke L J 1014, 1026. See also 
Mark E. Roszkowski, Vertical Maximum Price Fixing: In Defense of Albrecht, 23 Loyola 
U Chi L J 209, 212 (1992) (criticizing Jack Walters as an illustration of the claim that 
the Seventh Circuit, “unable directly to overrule Albrecht,” had narrowed it by means of 
the antitrust injury doctrine); Polden, 37 Cleve St L Rev at 219–20 (cited in noted 43) 
(criticizing the Seventh Circuit view, illustrated by Jack Walters, as unduly elevating 
allocative efficiency and resulting in a rule of nonrecovery for certain antitrust viola-
tions); John J. Flynn, The “Is” and “Ought” of Vertical Restraints after Monsanto Co. v. 
Spray-Rite Service Corp., 71 Cornell L Rev 1095, 1118–19 (1986) (broadly criticizing 
maximum RPM analysis in Jack Walters). 
 45 859 F2d 687 (9th Cir 1988), revd, 495 US 328 (1990). 
 46 Id at 697 & n 15; 490 US 1097 (1989) (granting certiorari). 
1066 The University of Chicago Law Review [86:1057 
 
I can’t substitute myself for Judges Reinhardt and Nelson, 
but I’ll tell you what I think is [in] their head. I think that 
the Seventh Circuit in Jack Walter[s] and [another case] 
said that there can be good price fixing. I [was] shocked by 
Judge Posner’s statement . . . that price fixing can be pro-
competitive; [that] it’s a legitimate competitive weapon.47 
The Court’s ARCO opinion, written by Justice William Brennan, 
vindicated Judge Posner’s position.48 The court concluded that 
even for a per se violation such as maximum RPM (Albrecht had 
not yet been overruled), antitrust injury must be shown, given 
its distinct purpose: “It ensures that the harm claimed by the 
plaintiff corresponds to the rationale for finding a violation of 
the antitrust laws in the first place, and it prevents losses that 
stem from competition from supporting suits by private plain-
tiffs for either damages or equitable relief.”49 
Jack Walters and ARCO had several effects. First, by under-
cutting the availability of damages, they reduced the attractive-
ness of maximum RPM cases to private plaintiffs. Government 
enforcers do not need to show antitrust injury,50 and hence their 
incentive to bring maximum RPM cases was unaffected. However, 
enforcers’ interest in bringing these cases was quite low. Thus, 
in practice these cases came close to a stealth overruling of  
Albrecht. 
Second, Jack Walters and ARCO paved the way for the formal 
overruling of Albrecht.51 In Khan v State Oil Co,52 the Seventh 
Circuit reviewed a form of maximum RPM imposed by a gaso-
line supplier on its customer, a gas station.53 Under the contract, 
the station paid the supplier a wholesale price that was 3.25 
cents less than the station’s “suggested” retail price. Any pro-
ceeds above the suggested price were rebated to the supplier.54 
 
 47 Transcript of Oral Argument, Atlantic Richfield Co v USA Petroleum Co, No 88-
1668, *45–46 (US filed Dec 5, 1989), archived at http://perma.cc/V65G-8Q79. 
 48 Atlantic Richfield Co v USA Petroleum Co, 495 US 328, 345–46 (1990). 
 49 Id at 342. 
 50 See California v American Stores Co, 495 US 271, 295–96 (1990) (describing the 
greater burden of private litigants compared to government enforcers). 
 51 For a critical view of the role of antitrust injury, see Jonathan M. Jacobson and 
Tracy Greer, Twenty-One Years of Antitrust Injury: Down the Alley with Brunswick v. 
Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, 66 Antitrust L J 273, 303 (1998) (“By basing its decision on antitrust 
injury grounds, the ARCO Court unnecessarily delayed the demise of Albrecht seven more 
years, giving the precedent additional time to do more damage in the lower courts.”). 
 52 93 F3d 1358 (7th Cir 1996). 
 53 Id at 1359–60. 
 54 Id at 1360. 
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As in Jack Walters, Posner once again discussed how maxi-
mum RPM can serve as a brake on the exercise of dealer market 
power55 and noted the incongruity between Sylvania’s permis-
siveness toward dealer territories and the unbending Albrecht 
rule.56 Moreover, in the wake of ARCO, Posner had a new ten-
sion to point out—that between ARCO and Albrecht.57 However, 
as with Jack Walters, these arguments alone were not enough to 
justify ignoring Albrecht as controlling precedent. Posner con-
tinued to resist the strategy, adopted (for example) by Judge 
Bork, of declaring a per se precedent effectively overruled in ad-
vance of the Supreme Court taking that step.58 
In contrast to Jack Walters, Posner concluded that the third 
strategy—to deny the existence of plaintiff’s antitrust injury—
was not available because, on his reading of the reasoning in 
ARCO, the Court apparently regarded maximum RPM as (some-
times) producing antitrust injury after all.59 Ultimately, Posner 
declared Albrecht to be “unsound when decided,” lamented its 
“increasingly wobbly, moth-eaten foundations,”60 and held that 
Albrecht controlled the facts of the case, effectively inviting the 
Supreme Court to reverse him. In State Oil Co v Khan,61 the 
Court unanimously obliged, overruling Albrecht while adopting 
 
 55 Id at 1362 (“As for maximum resale price fixing, unless the supplier is a monop-
sonist he cannot squeeze his dealers’ margins below a competitive level. . . . A supplier 
might, however, fix a maximum resale price in order to prevent his dealers from exploit-
ing a monopoly position.”). 
 56 State Oil, 93 F3d at 1363. 
 57 Id (“We have considerable sympathy with the argument that Albrecht is incon-
sistent with the cases that establish the requirement of proving antitrust injury. In fact, 
we think the argument is right and that it may well portend the doom of Albrecht.”). 
 58 See Rothery Storage & Van Co v Atlas Van Lines, Inc, 792 F2d 210, 229 (DC Cir 
1986) (concluding that two Supreme Court per se precedents, United States v Sealy Corp, 
388 US 350 (1967), and United States v Topco Associates, 405 US 596 (1972), are “effec-
tively overruled” by other rule-of-reason precedents). 
 59 In ARCO, the plaintiff was a competitor of the dealers subject to maximum RPM. 
Posner explained that the ARCO Court had distinguished Albrecht on the ground that 
those dealers, rather than a competitor, were the “intended beneficiaries of Albrecht.” 
State Oil, 93 F3d at 1364, discussing ARCO, 495 US at 336–37. From this distinction, 
Posner drew the implication that the Court regarded such dealers as having antitrust 
injury after all, apparently contrary to the Seventh Circuit’s conclusion on this point in 
Jack Walters. 
 60 State Oil, 93 F3d at 1363. For example, unlike other vertical restraints, maxi-
mum RPM does not interfere with price cutting, and (as discussed in the text) helps to 
reduce the potential anticompetitive effect of other vertical restraints by controlling the 
harmful effects of dealer territories. 
 61 522 US 3 (1997). 
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much of the reasoning set out in Posner’s two maximum RPM 
opinions.62 
III.  ANTITRUST INJURY BEYOND MAXIMUM RPM 
The potential use of antitrust injury as a means to under-
mine the rigid imposition of liability is not limited to maximum 
RPM. Consider minimum RPM, which after State Oil Co v Khan 
was the last remaining vertical intrabrand restraint still subject 
to per se liability. Several Seventh Circuit opinions chipped 
away at RPM on antitrust injury grounds.63 For example, in 
Isaksen v Vermont Castings, Inc,64 Posner considered a lost-
profits claim from a dealer forced to “knuckl[e] under” to a man-
ufacturer’s imposition of RPM.65 Such a dealer could be expected 
to claim that it had been forced to charge an unprofitably high 
price. 
Here, the antitrust injury objection was not that the chal-
lenged restraint was actually procompetitive. The issue was 
subtle: that prior to being forced into compliance, the dealer’s 
profits might have resulted, in part, from undercutting compet-
ing RPM-compliant dealers.66 Posner wrote: “The prevention of 
free riding is not, as yet anyway, a defense to a charge of resale 
price maintenance; but neither is being prevented from taking a 
free ride on another dealer’s efforts a form of antitrust injury 
compensable by a damage award.”67 Put another way, dealer 
profits inflated by the other dealers’ compliance with the RPM 
scheme offered an improper benchmark for calculating damages.68 
 
 62 See id at 20–22. 
 63 See Isaksen v Vermont Castings, Inc, 825 F2d 1158, 1165 (7th Cir 1987); Local 
Beauty Supply, Inc v Lamaur Inc, 787 F2d 1197, 1201–03 (7th Cir 1986). 
 64 825 F2d 1158 (7th Cir 1987). 
 65 Id at 1162. 
 66 The same issue had arisen in another case. In Local Beauty Supply, a dealer 
complained that due to termination, it had been denied the opportunity to undercut and 
free-ride on the investments of RPM-compliant dealers. In other words, “plaintiffs’ . . . 
profits were attributable to the violation of which they complained.” Local Beauty Sup-
ply, 787 F2d at 1203. The increased competition from ending RPM would hurt rather 
than help the plaintiff. 
 67 Isaksen, 825 F2d at 1165, citing Local Beauty Supply, 787 F2d at 1202. 
 68 Moreover, because the jury had no basis for distinguishing which part of the 
damages claim was based on an improper benchmark, the court concluded that the dam-
ages part of the case must be retried. Isaksen, 825 F2d at 1165. 
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Other defendants used antitrust injury to launch a frontal 
attack on RPM.69 For example, in PSKS, Inc v Leegin Creative 
Leather Products, Inc,70 defendants sought to introduce the tes-
timony of an economic expert to show “that consumers have not 
been harmed by Leegin’s conduct [and] that the arrangement 
promotes interbrand competition.”71 The district court, unwilling 
to grant defendants an indirect route to nullifying the per se 
rule, rejected this approach.72 Ultimately, the case reached the 
Supreme Court as Leegin Creative Leather Products, Inc v 
PSKS, Inc,73 in which the Supreme Court duly overruled its 
precedent, switching the test from per se liability to the rule of 
reason.74 
Beyond its continuing application in “wrong plaintiff” cases 
such as competitors complaining about a merger or horizontal 
agreement,75 the antitrust injury strategy has potential applica-
tion in any context in which arguably procompetitive conduct is 
subject to per se liability. With the continuing decline of per se 
liability in antitrust law, that domain is shrinking. A remaining 
example is tying cases, in which a modified per se approach ap-
plies.76 Defendants in these cases sometimes argue that even if 
liability attaches to the conduct, their conditional sale results in 
 
 69 Some commentators perceived such a goal in Isaksen itself. See Roger D. Blair 
and Jeffrey L. Harrison, Rethinking Antitrust Injury, 42 Vand L Rev 1539, 1557 (1989) 
(“Although the Seventh Circuit opinions [in Isaksen and Local Beauty Supply] are ex-
pressed in terms of antitrust injury, they also can be seen as having the substantive im-
pact of making resale price maintenance effectively per se lawful.”). 
 70 2004 WL 5374523 (ED Tex). 
 71 Id at *1. 
 72 Id. See also PSKS, Inc v Leegin Creative Leather Prods, 2004 WL 5254322, *1–2 
(ED Tex) (denying defendant’s motion for a new trial and repeating the court’s under-
standing that the defendant offered an indirect strategy for attacking the per se classifi-
cation for RPM). The Fifth Circuit affirmed. PSKS, Inc v Leegin Creative Leather Prods, 
171 Fed Appx 464, 467–68 (5th Cir 2006) (concluding that plaintiff established antitrust 
injury). 
 73 551 US 877 (2007). 
 74 Id at 882. 
 75 For example, in Hammes v AAMCO Transmissions, Inc, 33 F3d 774 (7th Cir 
1994), a dealer complained of exclusion from an advertising pool of other dealers. De-
fendants argued that the plaintiff had failed to allege antitrust injury. Posner agreed 
that a mere deprivation of cartel profits would not be compensable harm but had a dif-
ferent take on the complaint. Perhaps the plaintiff had wanted to undersell the dealers, 
he reasoned, and exclusion from the advertising pool was punishment. Posner concluded 
that this type of injury would indeed be compensable, and at the dismissal stage, it could 
not yet be said whether this was plaintiff’s theory. Id at 782–83. 
 76 This approach was set out in Jefferson Parish Hospital District No 2 v Hyde, 466 
US 2 (1984). 
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no economically coherent harm or that the particular plaintiff 
has not alleged a compensable harm.77 
Antitrust injury also furnished Posner with an analogy for 
use outside of antitrust law. For example, he deployed the anti-
trust injury approach while sitting as a district judge in a patent 
infringement case. In SmithKline Beecham Corp v Apotex Corp,78 
Posner considered a claim of patent infringement brought by a 
branded drug maker against a would-be generic competitor.79 To 
simplify a complex set of facts, the patent at issue covered a par-
ticular crystalline structure of the drug’s active ingredient. The 
generic made a different version of the active ingredient with a 
crystalline structure that was in the public domain. The brand 
presented evidence that the patented version would neverthe-
less be present in the generic’s product in minute quantities, al-
beit as an unwanted byproduct that added nothing to the safety 
or efficacy of the drug. 
Posner held a two-week bench trial and issued a lengthy 
opinion about two weeks later.80 As one of several grounds for 
denying injunctive relief to plaintiffs, Posner concluded that the 
plaintiff’s injury was not of the kind that the law was intended 
to prevent.81 To buttress this conclusion, he pointed to antitrust 
injury, citing Jack Walters82 and “the colorful though very sad 
 
 77 See, for example, Midwest Gas Services, Inc v Indiana Gas Co, 317 F3d 703, 712–
13 (7th Cir 2003) (affirming dismissal of tying claims because claimed injury of lost prof-
its resulted from conduct that was not anticompetitive); Todorov v DCH Healthcare Au-
thority, 921 F2d 1438, 1453–54 (11th Cir 1991) (holding that, similar to Local Beauty 
Supply, no antitrust injury was present when the harm complained of was a lost oppor-
tunity to profit from the anticompetitive scheme); CBC Companies, Inc v Equifax, Inc, 
561 F3d 569, 571–73 (6th Cir 2009) (dismissing a tying claim for lack of antitrust injury 
on the ground that allegations of harm in the tied product market were merely concluso-
ry). But see Palmyra Park Hospital, Inc v Phoebe Putney Memorial Hospital, 604 F3d 
1291, 1303 (11th Cir 2010) (concluding, in a tying case, that the plaintiff alleged anti-
trust injury resulting from its exclusion in tied product market). 
 78 247 F Supp 2d 1011 (ND Ill 2003). I clerked for Judge Posner when this case was 
decided. 
 79 Id at 1013. 
 80 Id at 1011, 1013 (reporting that a bench trial was held from February 5 to February 
21 and an opinion issued on March 3, 2003). 
 81 Id at 1048. See also Kaz Manufacturing Co v Chesebrough-Ponds, Inc, 317 F2d 
679, 680 n 3 (2d Cir 1963) (“[O]ne who constructs a patented wall safe but uses it only as 
an anchor for his boat would not be a patent infringer since such use would not be for the 
purpose of utilizing the teachings of the patent.”). 
 82 SmithKline Beecham, 247 F Supp 2d at 1048, citing Jack Walters, 737 F2d at 
708–09. 
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old case” of Gorris v Scott.83 Posner’s approach has been echoed 
in recent academic calls to recognize “IP injury” and enforce IP 
law only when there is a violation of a core IP policy.84 The Federal 
Circuit never reached this argument in SmithKline Beecham, af-
firming on other grounds,85 and the real-world influence of this 
idea remains to be seen. 
IV.  HORIZONTAL RESTRAINTS 
In altering the law of vertical restraints, Posner’s scholar-
ship and judicial opinions have had a powerful and synergistic 
effect. Horizontal restraints provide a stark contrast. Here too, 
Posner staked out a distinctive position as an academic, but his 
opinions do not reflect similar progress toward judicial imple-
mentation. Instead, Posner ultimately became their leading ju-
dicial opponent. 
During his first year as an academic, prior to joining the 
Chicago faculty, Posner considered what forms of collusion con-
stitute an agreement—a “contract, combination . . . or conspiracy, 
in restraint of trade”86—as required under § 1 of the Sherman 
Act. Collusion, as I use the term here, refers to coordination by 
rivals as to some aspect of competition (for example, price or 
customers served) such that the firms achieve higher profits 
compared to a benchmark in which the parties did not coordi-
nate in this manner. The benchmark is the equilibrium outcome 
if the parties met just once in the marketplace. The gains from 
collusion come from cooperation over time in refraining from 
competition, despite each firm’s temptation to cheat on the  
arrangement. 
Collusion can be either express or tacit. Tacit collusion refers 
to interdependent conduct87 unaccompanied by communications 
between or among the parties. By contrast, express collusion is 
 
 83 SmithKline Beecham, 247 F Supp 2d at 1048 (“The principle is general and I 
cannot think of any reason why it should not apply to patent law.”). 
 84 See, for example, Christina Bohannan and Herbert Hovenkamp, Creation with-
out Restraint: Promoting Liberty and Rivalry in Innovation 50–55 (Oxford 2012). 
 85 SmithKline Beecham Corp v Apotex Corp, 403 F3d 1331, 1334 (Fed Cir 2005). 
 86 15 USC § 1. 
 87 See Louis Kaplow, Direct versus Communications-Based Prohibitions on Price 
Fixing, 3 J Legal Analysis 449, 451 (2011) (defining interdependence as a situation in 
which “firms refrain from price cutting because of an expectation of retaliation derived from 
a shared appreciation of their circumstances”). See also Donald F. Turner, The Definition 
of Agreement under the Sherman Act: Conscious Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 
Harv L Rev 655, 663 (1962) (discussing “conscious parallelism”). 
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collusion that is not tacit—that is, reaching a collusive outcome 
with the assistance of communications. Communications facili-
tate collusion by helping to solve the economic challenges of co-
ordination and prevention of cheating. 
There is consensus that collusion supported by communica-
tion suffices to establish an agreement. To this end, a plaintiff 
might present direct evidence of agreement, such as a videotape 
of the conspirators caught in the act. In other cases, a plaintiff 
presents circumstantial evidence that indicates that the parties 
must have communicated, such as an unusual pattern of behav-
ior that is hard to explain without communication.88 The ques-
tion that interested Posner is whether purely tacit collusion is 
enough to satisfy the agreement requirement, either because 
such collusion is unlawful in its own right or because evidence of 
tacit collusion is probative of the existence of unobserved com-
munications. The Supreme Court has not offered a clear answer 
to this question.89 
Posner’s 1969 paper on the subject staked out the position 
that tacit collusion does violate antitrust law.90 He emphasized 
that the structure of the problem of oligopolistic price elevation 
does not depend on “detectable acts of collusion.”91 Price eleva-
tion is a voluntary rather than inevitable act. Posner acknowl-
edged that identifying actionable price elevation would be diffi-
cult and, with respect to remedies, thought that the main 
challenge was to make sure that damages are high enough to 
achieve adequate deterrence given the difficulties of proving a 
case and the reluctance of courts to impose high penalties.92 
As a judge, however, Posner made little effort to nudge the 
law toward an explicit recognition of liability for tacit collusion. 
His comments on the subject were notably circumspect. For ex-
ample, in In re High Fructose Corn Syrup Antitrust Litigation,93 
Posner wrote that “it is generally believed, and the plaintiffs 
 
 88 See, for example, Interstate Circuit, Inc v United States, 306 US 208, 221 (1939). 
 89 For perspectives on the case law, see Louis Kaplow, Competition Policy and Price 
Fixing 69–92 (Princeton 2013); Keith N. Hylton, Oligopoly Pricing and Richard Posner, 
18 Antitrust Source 1, 10–13 (Oct 2018). 
 90 See generally Richard A. Posner, Oligopoly and the Antitrust Laws: A Suggested 
Approach, 21 Stan L Rev 1562 (1969). This work was also incorporated in Posner’s anti-
trust book. Posner, Antitrust Law: An Economic Perspective at 47 (cited in note 6). 
 91 Posner, 21 Stan L Rev at 1562 (cited in note 90). See also id at 1575 (“There is 
. . . no vital difference between formal cartels and tacit collusive arrangements; the latter 
are simply easier to conceal.”). 
 92 Id at 1590–91. 
 93 295 F3d 651 (7th Cir 2002). 
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implicitly accept, that an express, manifested agreement, and 
thus an agreement involving actual, verbalized communication, 
must be proved in order for a price-fixing conspiracy to be ac-
tionable under the Sherman Act.”94 This statement left open the 
possibility of a broader definition without endorsing it. In JTC 
Petroleum v Piasa Motor Fuels,95 Posner went a bit further, mus-
ing that when “oligopolistic interdependence” could be shown, a 
plaintiff could establish the existence of “a combination or a (tacit) 
conspiracy.”96 
Around 2015, Posner took a sharp turn against his previous 
academic views. The first evidence was a review of Louis 
Kaplow’s book about horizontal agreement and price fixing.97 
Kaplow’s book offers a sophisticated attack on a conception of 
agreement that is limited to express collusion.98 In the review, 
Posner repudiated his previous view that tacit collusion or mere 
interdependence is actionable.99 He despaired that efforts to re-
mediate interdependent pricing would face insuperable practical 
difficulties (an issue that Posner had acknowledged even in the 
1960s). In particular, an injunction would be futile: How could a 
court implement or a firm respond to the requirement that a 
firm instead charge a more competitive price, or cease taking its 
competitor’s prices into account?100 
This change of heart found its way into Seventh Circuit ju-
risprudence in Posner’s 2015 opinion in In re Text Messaging 
Antitrust Litigation.101 Plaintiffs had alleged a conspiracy by four 
wireless carriers to fix the price of text messages.102 At the dis-
missal stage, the court (in an opinion also written by Posner) 
 
 94 Id at 654. 
 95 190 F3d 775 (7th Cir 1999). 
 96 Id at 780. At the same time, Judge Posner declined to recognize a shared monop-
oly theory under § 2, by which he meant collective liability without any showing of 
agreement among the excluders. Id. 
 97 See generally Richard A. Posner, Book Review, Review of Kaplow, Competition 
Policy and Price Fixing, 79 Antitrust L J 761 (2014). 
 98 See Kaplow, Competition Policy and Price Fixing at 387–97 (cited in note 89). 
 99 Posner, 79 Antitrust L J at 763 (cited in note 97). 
 100 Id at 764, 767. Here, Posner’s view echoed those made by his opponent, Don 
Turner, in the 1960s. See Turner, 75 Harv L Rev at 669 (cited in note 87) (“[S]uch an in-
junction, read literally, appears to demand such irrational behavior that full compliance 
would be virtually impossible.”). 
 101 782 F3d 867 (7th Cir 2015). 
 102 The claims involved “per use” message pricing, as opposed to a monthly charge 
for a certain number (often unlimited) of messages. Plaintiffs alleged that the four de-
fendants, in a series of ten steps from 2005 to 2008, raised the price of per-use texts from 
as low as two cents to twenty cents. Id at 875. 
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had allowed the case to proceed.103 The 2015 opinion reviewed 
the district court’s grant of summary judgment to defendants af-
ter discovery. 
Here, Posner bluntly stated that “[e]xpress collusion vio-
lates antitrust law; tacit collusion does not.”104 Posner concluded 
that evidence of a market structure conducive to collusion and of 
noncompetitive market performance were insufficient because 
they did not clearly point toward express collusion.105 According 
to Keith Hylton, Posner’s opinion is the first at the appellate 
level to “so clearly” state that tacit collusion is insufficient to 
support a § 1 violation.106  
Text Messaging has influenced other courts107 and has begun 
to attract commentary.108 To the extent that Posner’s new view 
ultimately takes hold, it may be difficult to separate the influ-
ence of Posner the judge (in embracing this view) from Posner 
the commentator (in withdrawing as a prominent supporter of 
the contrary position). 
CONCLUSION 
The Jack Walters and Text Messaging opinions bookend an 
exceptional judicial career. In Jack Walters, one of Posner’s first 
antitrust opinions, we see the judge pressing hard to incorporate 
his academic views into antitrust law. In Text Messaging, one of 
Posner’s last, we see the reverse: shaping Seventh Circuit law to 
expressly reject one of his signature academic positions. At the 
same time, Posner’s disparate approach to these two areas of anti-
trust doctrine share an important point of commonality, one en-
tirely in keeping with his iconoclastic approach to other areas of 
 
 103 In re Text Messaging Antitrust Litigation, 630 F3d 622, 628–29 (7th Cir 2010) 
(discussing Bell Atlantic Corp v Twombly, 550 US 544 (2007)). 
 104 Text Messaging, 782 F3d at 872. 
 105 Id at 879. 
 106 Hylton, 18 Antitrust Source at 3 (cited in note 89) (“As far as I am aware, [Text 
Messaging] is the first appellate court opinion to state such a position so clearly.”). 
 107 See, for example, Valspar Corp v E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co, 873 F3d 185, 
200 & n 13 (3d Cir 2017) (citing Text Messaging for the proposition that acting in accord-
ance with tacit understanding of how competitors will act is not actionable). See also 
Kleen Products LLC v Georgia-Pacific LLC, 910 F3d 927, 935 (7th Cir 2018) (similar). 
 108 See, for example, Douglas H. Ginsburg, Posner on Antitrust Remedies: The Good, 
the Bad, and the Very Ugly, 18 Antitrust Source 1, 7–9 & n 47 (Oct 2018) (discussing 
Posner’s changed view); Salil K. Mehra, Antitrust and the Robo-Seller: Competition in the 
Time of Algorithms, 100 Minn L Rev 1323, 1343 (2016) (“[T]he advent of the robo-seller 
shifts the balance between these arguments in the direction of Posner’s half-century-old 
argument.”). 
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law. Whether the target is a Supreme Court case he had won 
just a few years previously or a long-held academic view, Posner 
has never been afraid to change his mind. 
